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SHAFFER v. HEITNER: NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS CONCERNING SEIDER v. ROTH
The Supreme Court decision in Shaffer v. Heitner1 marked
the collapse of a century-old conceptual framework for assuring due
process in the assertion of state court jurisdiction. This note will
briefly trace the developments in the law of jurisdiction which led
to Shaffer and will examine Shaffer in light of those past decisions.
It will demonstrate that, while the Court was justified in its holding,
it misapplied its holding to the facts of the case. Not only did the
Court's misapplication of the holding cause it to arrive at an unjust
result, but this misapplication also created serious doubt as to the
manner in which Shaffer should be interpreted.
Furthermore, this note will analyze the effect of Shaffer on
the Seider v. Roth2 attachment procedure in New York, which developed as part of the earlier concept of jurisdiction. It will demonstrate that Seider should be overruled in light of Shaffer.
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF STATE COURT JURISDICTION:
A CHANGING CONCEPT FOR A CHANGING NATION

A century ago in Pennoyer v. Neff, 3 the Supreme Court
granted constitutional status to a concept of state court jurisdiction
4
which had been adopted by several states almost a century earlier.
Pennoyer was an action to recover possession of a tract of land. 5
Neff sought to recover the land from Pennoyer, claiming that an
earlier default judgment which caused him to forfeit his land was
void because the court which rendered the judgment did not have
personal jurisdiction over him. His assertion rested on three premises: (1) He was a nonresident of the forum state; (2) he was not
personally served within the state; and (3) he did not appear
therein. 6 Thus, the issue in Pennoyer was whether the court in the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
See, e.g., Phelps v. Holker, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 261 (1788).
Neff asserted title to the property under a patent. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.

714, 719 (1877). Pennoyer claimed title to the land under a sheriff's deed. The
sheriff's deed was made upon a sale of the property in execution of a judgment
against Neff in a previous contract action against him by one Mitchell. Id.
6. Id. at 719-20.
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previous action had authority to determine a nonresident's rights
and obligations regarding a resident of the forum. In rendering the
judgment void against Neff, Justice Field articulated what later became known as the "power" 7 concept of jurisdiction.
Justice Field stated that the law of state court jurisdiction was
defined by the principles of public law that govern relationships
among independent nations. 8 There were three basic principles.
First, "the validity of every judgment depends upon the jurisdiction of the court before [the judgment] is rendered .... "9 Second,
"'every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory."'10 Third, "no State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons and property
without its territory."'" An important corollary to these rules was
that "in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the
non-resident situated within its limits . . . its tribunals can inquire
into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens . . . only to
12
the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property.'
Thus, unless a nonresident defendant owned property in the state,
was served with process in the state, 13 or voluntarily consented to
suit in the forum,' 4 the state's assertion of jurisdiction over him
constituted a denial of his fourteenth amendment right to due process. 15
The principles enunciated in Pennoyer provided a basis for establishing three classes of jurisdiction which have been utilized by
courts throughout the last century. 16 In Hanson v. Denckla, 1 7 the
Supreme Court enumerated those classes:
A judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one person in favor of another. A judgment in rem
affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A
7. For a discussion of the "power" concept of Pennoyer, see Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
9. Id. at 728.
10. Id. at 722.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 723.
13. Id. at 733.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966) (applying in rem rules of Pennoyer).
17. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons
in designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the
plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject
property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks
to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to
the satisfaction of a claim against him. 18

Under the standard of Pennoyer, a judgment in personam can
only be rendered against a resident defendant, a defendant who is
served within the state, or a defendant who voluntarily submits to
suit in the forum. Thus, under Pennoyer, it was difficult to gain
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
While the power notion may have been a sensible system for
asserting jurisdiction in 1877, it subsequently became less effective.
After Pennoyer the nation became more mobile. 19 New modes of
transportation provided faster, more convenient travel. Consequently, interstate travel and commerce increased. It became
possible for nonresidents to visit a state and cause injury, and leave
the state before they could be served with process. For years following Pennoyer, courts, subject to the constraint of stare decisis,
resorted to legal fictions and attenuated logic to comply with the
stringent requirements of Pennoyer, while providing a forum for
20
resident plaintiffs.
Eventually, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 1 the
Court responded to the need for a new theory which would provide for personal jurisdiction over transient nonresidents, with no
in-State property, who caused injury within the forum state. Con18. Id. at 246 n.12 (citation omitted).
19. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
20. For cases discussing the "implied consent" fiction, see, for example, Henry
L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627-28 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352, 356 (1927); Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1918).
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, id., the State
of Washington, pursuant to statute, sought to collect unemployment taxes from a shoe
company, based on commissions paid by the firm to its Washington-based salesmen.
The firm was sued by the state for nonpayment of those taxes. Subsequent to a
judgment in favor of plaintiff, id. at 313, the firm appealed on the grounds that
Washington lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment. Id. at 311. The International
Shoe Company was incorporated in Delaware. Its principal place of business was in
Missouri. Id. at 313. The firm conducted no business in Washington except for the
activities of its Washington-based salesmen, who solicited orders for the firm. Id.
There was no Washington office, but the salesmen sometimes rented display rooms
in the state. Id. at 314. The salesmen had no authority to enter contracts; all orders
had to be approved by the home office. Id. at 313-14.
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testing jurisdiction of a Washington court, the International Shoe
Company, a foreign corporation which conducted some of its activity in the State of Washington, claimed that its activities within the
forum state were insufficient to manifest its "presence" 22 there.
The company insisted that due process forbade the Washington
court to render an in personam judgment against it. 23 The Supreme Court noted that under Pennoyer, defendant's "presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him,"2 4 but rejected the
Pennoyer rule in favor of a more functional view of jurisdiction.
Justice Stone stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradtional notions of fair play and substantial justice."2 5
"Minimum contacts" is an elusive concept. In International
Shoe the Court stated:
[T]he criteria by which we mark the boundary line betveen
those activities which justify the subjection of a [defendant] to
suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative .... Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
26
purpose of the due process clause to insure.
Since the International Shoe standard was first articulated,
courts, committed to applying that standard, have detailed the
minimum contacts standard on a case-by-case basis. 2 7 In addition,
most states have responded to InternationalShoe by enacting "long

22. Corporate "presence" was one fiction employed by the courts to ameliorate
the stringent rule of Pennoyer. The corporate presence fiction was articulated by

Justice Brandeis: "A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal
liability, in the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the state in
such a manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there."
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945).
24. Id. at 316.
25. Id. (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 319.
27. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours,
Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
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arm" statutes which specify those in-State acts which suffice to subject a defendant to suit in that state. 28 Since it is the quality and
nature of the act which is the focus of investigation, even an act
having foreseeable in-State consequences committed outside the
state may have sufficient connection with the state to justify asser29
tion of jurisdiction.
The Court in International Shoe sought to achieve two goals
by adopting the new standard: first, fairness to the defendant, by
preventing the inconveniences which result from a trial away from
home. 30 One commentator has suggested that these inconveniences
include a defendant's interest in avoiding the extra expense and
effort, and in avoiding the problems which might arise in obtaining
witnesses and evidence, for litigation away from home. 31 In the
wake of InternationalShoe, some courts have interpreted the standard of "fair play and substantial justice" to include the interests of
32
the plaintiff, as well.
Second, out of respect for federalism, 33 the Court sought to
28. The uniform long arm statute provides:

(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state;
[or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property, in this state
k or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only
a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this
section may be asserted against him.
UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT 103.4 (1962 version).
29. See, e.g., Grey v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 438, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961) (defendant held liable for explosion of hot
water heater safety valve in-State, negligently constructed out-of-State); UNIFORM
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT 103.4(b) (1962 version), quoted
at note 28 supra.
30. International Shoe Co.v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
31. See Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 600, 610 (1977).
32. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
33.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 319 (1945).
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protect the interests of the state asserting jurisdiction. The Court
stated:
[The due process] clause does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations....
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege
of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protections of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the
state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to
suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be
34
said to be undue.
Cases decided after International Shoe have identified legitimate interests that a state might seek to vindicate.3 5These state interests include avoiding financial detriment to itself avoiding mul37
tiple litigation, 6 and permitting effective recourse to its laws.
The nonresident defendant, whose conduct affects the interests
of the resident plaintiff and those of the state seeking to assert
jurisdiction, creates conflict in interests. This conflict may be resolved by balancing the interests of the state and the plaintiff in
suing in the proposed forum against the interests of the defendant
in being sued in a "reasonable" 38 forum. 3 9
Cases following International Shoe reveal that imposed upon
this apparently neutral interest-balancing analysis is a prodefendant
bias. Looking to the language of International Shoe, one commentator suggested: "[T]he purpose of the rules of in personam and in
rem jurisdiction is to ensure that the defendant not be sued away
from his natural forum without sufficient justification. This purpose
34. Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
35. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Watson
v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954) (finding that state has
interest in assuring that its injured residents receive insurance payments so that they
do not become burden on state).
36. See, e.g., Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950) (New York has interest in managing common trust funds created by state's
laws).
38. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), referred to defendant's right to be sued in a "reasonable" forum. Id. at 317.
39. The concept of characterizing the International Shoe standard as a balancing test is not new. See generally Smit, supra note 31.
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that the forum chosen
is significantly different from that of ensuring
40
view."
of
points
all
be reasonable from
The prodefendant bias has been afforded varying degrees of
respect as the law of jurisdiction has developed. 4 1 Under the rigid
framework of Pennoyer, the bias was clear. It was difficult to attain
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who had to be served with
process within the state. International Shoe relieved some of the
difficulty in suing nonresidents, but did not eliminate jurisdictional
limitations entirely. The Court in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.42 justified the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts with the forum were indeed minimal, 4 3 noting
a "trend. . . toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents."44 After
the broad interpretation of International Shoe by the Court in
McGee, it appeared that a proplaintiff bias was developing until, in
Hanson v. Denckla,4 5 the Court clearly reaffirmed the prodefendant bias. Referring to the trend noted in McGee, the Court in
Hanson stated:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts .... Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign
tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he
that are a prehas had the "minimal contacts" with that4 State
6
requisite to its exercise of power over him.
While reaffirming the prodefendant bias, Hanson established a
threshold measure for courts to determine the sufficiency of a non40. Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
41. The prodefendant bias is ancient, emerging from Roman law. The Roman
maxim, actorforum rei sequitur, means "the plaintiff must pursue the defendant in
his forum." von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1127 n.13 (1966). One commentator suggested that
justification for perpetuating this bias derives from the notion that the plaintiff, by
instituting the suit, acts contrary to the social policy that discourages litigation;
hence, the defendant should be favored. See Smit, supra note 31, at 608.
42. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
43. Defendant's only contact with California was mailing a reinsurance contract
to plaintiff's deceased. Id. at 221.
44. Id. at 222.
45. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
46. Id. at 251 (citations omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 393

resident's contacts with the state asserting jurisdiction. The Court
found it "essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefit and protections of its laws." 47 Thus, after Hanson, in any assertion of jurisdiction, the focus is on the activities of the defendant within the
forum state which give rise to the defendant's obligation to submit to suit in the jurisdiction. In short, an interest-balancing analysis, in which the scale is tipped from the outset in favor of the defendant, is a convenient tool for applying the International Shoe
standard.
Although the International Shoe standard ameliorated the
problems created by the continued application of the Pennoyer
rules in the sphere of in personam jurisdiction, the in rem rules
remained intact. 48 Recently, the Court in Shaffer declared that the
in rem rules, as they existed a century ago in Pennoyer, no longer
assure due process in and of themselves. 4 9 Thus, the decision in
Shaffer marks the final collapse of the power framework of state
court jurisdiction, and creates a comprehensive, functional law of
jurisdiction, suitable for a nation one hundred years more mature
than it was in the days of Pennoyer.
SHAFFER V. HEITNER5 0

The controversy in Shaffer concerned the constitutionality of
Delaware's sequestration statute. 5 1 That statute empowered the
court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by seizing
any property the defendant owned in the state. The statute provided the defendant with two alternatives subsequent to seizure:
either to enter a general appearance 52 to defend the sequestered
47. Id. at 253.
48. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
49. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2584-85 (1977).
50. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
51. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974) provides in pertinent part:
The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all
or any part of his property, which property may be sold under the order of
the Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults. Any defendant whose property shall have been
so seized and who shall have entered a general appearance in the cause
may, upon notice to the plaintiff, petition the Court for an order releasing
such property or any part thereof from the seizure.
52. "A party who enters a general appearance in an action confers on the court
jurisdiction to enter a judgment against his person." R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 700 (1973).
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property or to default and lose the property. Appellee Heitner, a
nonresident of Delaware, initiated a shareholders' derivative suit
in a Delaware chancery court, naming as defendants Greyhound
Corporation, Greyhound Lines, Incorporated (a subsidiary of
Greyhound Corporation), and twenty-eight present or former officers, directors, or employees of both Greyhound and its subsidiary. 5 3 Although the corporation was incorporated in Delaware
and therefore subject to Delaware's assertion of in personam jurisdiction, the individual defendants were all nonresidents of that
state, rendering personal jurisdiction impossible. 54 Quasi in rem
jurisdiction over the individual defendants was, however, asserted
under the sequestration statute.5 5 The sequestered property consisted primarily of stock and options in the Greyhound Corporation. 56 None of the certificates representing the seized property
57
was physically present in Delaware, but since a Delaware statute
establishes Delaware as the situs of stock in Delaware corporations,
the stock and options were considered located in Delaware and
subject to seizure ufider the Delaware Code. 58 After receiving
notice of the sequesttation, defendants entered a special appearance 59 to move, to quash service of process, to vacate the sequestration order, -and to contest Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction. 60 In
contesting jurisdiction, the defendants elaimed that their contacts
with Delaware were insufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the
rule of International Shoe. 61 In challenging the sequestration order, defendants argued that the absence of a meaningful opportunity to be heard denied them due process under the Sniadachkb
Family Finance Corp.62 line of cases. 63 The chancery court re53. Brief for Appellants at 4, Shaffer v. Heitner_97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
54. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2571-72 (1977).
-55. Id. at 2573.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 2574. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974) provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment, and jurisdiction of
all courts in this state, but not for purposes of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this

state, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded
as in this state.
58. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2574 (1977).
59. A defendant may appear specially in an action to contest jurisdiction without being subject to a judgment on the merits. See R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, CIvIL
PROCEDURE 700 (1973).
.69. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2574 (1977).
61. Id -.
62. 395 U.S. 337-(196M).
63. The Sniadach v. Fanily Fin. Corp., id., line of cases includes North Ga.
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jected both arguments, and found for plaintiff.
Defendants appealed both the question of jurisdiction and the
validity of the sequestration order. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the chancery court regarding both arguments. 64 Most of that court's opinion was directed to
rejecting appellants' contention that the sequestration procedure is
inconsistent with due process according to the Sniadach line of
cases. 65 The court summarily dismissed the jurisdictional argument. It held that since quasi in rem jurisdiction was asserted
under the Delaware Code, 66 and therefore justified by the presence of defendant's stock in Delaware, defendant's contacts were
irrelevant; the rule of International Shoe was applicable only to
67
assertions of in personam jurisdiction.
Reversing the Delaware court's decision, 6 8 the Supreme Court
focused on the ruling that the International Shoe test does not
apply to quasi in rem jurisdiction.6 9 The Court in Shaffer stated:
"This categorical analysis assumes the continued soundness of the
conceptual structure founded on the century-old case of Pennoyer
v. Neff." 70 The remainder of the Supreme Court opinion concentrated on the following: (1) principles enunciated in Pennoyer;7 1 (2)
developments in the law since Pennoyer;72 (3) the International
Shoe standard and its usefulness in solving problems generated by
continued application of Pennoyer to assertions of in personam
jurisdiction; 73 (4) failure of the Pennoyer principles to provide due
process in jurisdiction in rem. 74 The Supreme Court concluded that
the International Shoe standard should govern actions in rem as
well as actions in personam to assure procedural due process. 7 5
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
415 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The issue in those cases
involving foreign attachment was the absence of a meaningful opportunity to be
heard before seizure. The Delaware chancery court had held that issue to be distinct from the issue of jurisdiction as a result of foreign attachment. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2574 (1977).
64. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
65. Id.
66. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974).
67. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976).
68. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2587 (1977).
69. Id. at 2576.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2576-78.
72. Id. at 2578-79.
73. Id. at 2579-80.
74. Id. at 2580-81.
75. Id. at 2584.
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The Court's rationale in Shaffer for applying the International
76
Shoe test to in rem jurisdiction is "simple and straightforward":
It is premised on the recognition that "[tihe phrase, 'judicial
jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 56, introductory note.
This recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify
an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must
be sufficient to justify exercising "jurisdiction over the interests
of persons in a thing." The standard for determining whether an
exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent
with the Due Process Clause is77the minimal contacts standard
elucidated in InternationalShoe.
In deciding that minimal contacts must be present in all assertions of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court did not entirely eliminate
the concept of in rem jurisdiction. Rather, the Court stated that the
presence of in-State property, without additional contacts, is insufficient support for asserting jurisdiction. The Court noted that
presence of defendant's property in a state might suggest other ties
among the defendant, the state, and the litigation. 78 Thus, the
Court found that when claims to the in-State property itself are the
source of the underlying dispute, or when the underlying dispute
is a tort claim based on an injury suffered on the in-State property,
minimal contacts are likely to be present. 79 The class of in rem
actions which the Court found would be most affected by its decision are assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction in which the in-State
property was "completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action."80
76. Id. at 2581.
77. Id. at 2581-82 (footnotes omitted). Oddly enough, Justice Field recognized
this basis for in rem jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), but attributed little weight to it throughout the rest of the opinion. Id. at 734.
78. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2582 (1977).
79.

Id.

80. Id. The Court explained that such instances are typified by the situation in
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The Court in Shaffer explained that in Harris,
Epstein, a resident of Maryland, had a claim against Balk, a resident of North
Carolina. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2578,(1977). Harris, another North
Carolina resident, owed money to Balk. When Harris happened to visit Maryland,
Epstein garnished Harris's debt to Balk. Harris did not contest the debt to Balk and
paid it to Epstein's North Carolina attorney. When Balk later sued Harris in North
Carolina, the Court held that the full faith and credit clause required that Harris's
payment to Epstein be treated as a discharge of his debt to Balk. Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215, 226 (1905). The Court reasoned that the debt owed Balk by Harris was
intangible property belonging to Balk and that the situs of the debt traveled with the
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Concluding that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny,"81 the Court applied those standards to the
facts of Shaffer. In so doing, it found that the statutory presence of
defendants' stock in Delaware was insufficient contact with Delaware to support a finding of jurisdiction over the nonresident de83
fendants, 8 2 and reversed the Delaware decision.
In Shaffer there were two concurring opinions and a dissenting opinion. Justice Powell's concurrence suggested that "the ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and
permanently located within a State [i.e., real property] may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to
jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the value of the property."8 4 Acceptance of the existence of such property, he
suggested, "would avoid the uncertainty of the general Interna' 85
tional Shoe standard."
Justice Stevens also concurred in a separate opinion. The
thrust of his opinion was that the notice requirement of the due
process clause necessitates "fair warning that a particular activity
's
may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, when adjudication in the forum
state is a predictable risk of the defendant's activity, an assertion of
jurisdiction complies with due process requirements. Because Justice Stevens viewed foreseeability as the deciding factor in determining jurisdiction, he was concerned that the Court's opinion
reached too far, 87 since in view of its facts, Shaffer can be read to
deny jurisdiction in situations where suit in the forum state was
foreseeable.
In dissent, Justice Brennan concurred with the Court's finding
that the due process clause requires the application of the International Shoe test to all assertions of jurisdiction. However, Justice
debtor. By obtaining personal jurisdiction over Harris, Epstein had arrested his debt
to Balk and brought it into Maryland. Id. Under the rules of quasi in rem jurisdiction
established by Pennoyer, Epstein was entitled to proceed against that debt to vindicate his claim against Balk, even though Balk himself was not personally subject to
the jurisdiction of the Maryland court. Id.
81. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2585 (1977).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
86. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Brennan dissented from the Court's finding that the defendants'
activities in Shaffer did not constitute minimum contacts; he believed that defendants' acceptance of positions as corporate officers
in a Delaware corporation was sufficient contacts to justify Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction. 88 This note concurs with and will
expand upon Justice Brennan's argument.
CRITIcAL ANALYSIS OF

Shaffer

An Anticipated Holding
That the Supreme Court held that minimal contacts must be
present in all assertions of jurisdiction is hardly surprising. After
studying the literature on jurisdiction which followed Pennoyer,
one court remarked:
Over the last thirty years, . .. a veritable army of courts and
commentators have besieged the citadel of territorial jurisdiction.
The old territorial standards have been castigated as at once too
restrictive and too permissive, preventing states from obtaining
jurisdiction in cases in which they had substantial "interest,"
while permitting the exercise of authority by states that were
virtual strangers to both parties and the claim. 89
Commentators have urged that while quasi in rem jurisdiction
initially served a useful role as a partial escape from the rigid
framework of Pennoyer, it is rendered unnecessary by the increase
in long arm jurisdiction. 90 Furthermore, commentators 91 and
courts 92 have consistently maintained that since a proceeding
against property is, in effect, a proceeding against the owner of that
property, rules of personal jurisdiction ought to apply in such instances. Some lower courts have already applied the International
88. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 458 (1974).
90. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Hazard, A General
Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction,[1965] SuP. CT. REv. 241; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REv. 657 (1959); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Note,
Foreign Attachment Power Constrained-An End to Quasi in Rein Jurisdiction?,31
U. MiA n L. REv. 419 (1977).
91. See generally authorities cited note 90 supra.
92. See, e.g., U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 147-55 (3d Cir. 1976);
Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz. App. 258, 260-64, 401 P.2d 743, 745-47 (1965).
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Shoe standard to defeat jurisdiction in in rem actions. 93 Thus, the
Court in Shaffer recognized 9 4 that it was responding to criticism of
quasi in rem jurisdiction as an obsolete doctrine.
An UnanticipatedResult: Applying the International
Shoe Standard to the Facts of Shaffer
While the Court's holding that the InternationalShoe standard
must be applied in all assertions of jurisdiction is not surprising, its
determination that the defendants had not met that standard was
unexpected. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that
the majority misapplied the minimum contacts test to the facts of
95
Shaffer.
Fundamental to the application of the InternationalShoe standard is that the interests of the plaintiff and of the state asserting
jurisdiction only become paramount when the defendant's interest
in being sued at home is depreciated. 96 Thus, the decisive questions in applying the standard are: (1) whether the plaintiff has any
interest in bringing suit in the state asserting jurisdiction; (2)
whether the state asserting jurisdiction has any legitimate interest
in conducting the litigation; and (3) whether the defendant has, by
his activities, submitted to the authority of the state such as to
depreciate his interest in being. sued in his home state.9 7 Thus, an
examination of the parties' interests in Shaffer is appropriate.
Delaware had a legitimate interest in providing a forum for the
litigation; a state has an interest in "permitting effective recourse to
its laws." 9 8 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,99 the
Court found the State of New York to be interested in managing a
trust fund established under its laws because the fund was a legal
entity of the State of New York. 10 0 A corporation, like a trust fund,
is an entity created under the laws of a state; thus, Delaware was
similarly interested in managing a corporation created under the
laws of Delaware. Petitioners advocated this position, stating:
93. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H.
281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
94. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580-81 (1977).
95. Id. at 2588-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
97. Smit, supra note 31, at 608-09.
98. Id. at 612.
99. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
100. Id. at 313.
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The Greyhound Corporation is a creature of the state of Delaware. Its purposes are sanctioned by that state. Appellant's au-

thority and powers are regulated and defined by its laws. Delaware has a vital state interest in calling into account the officers,
directors, and key employees of a corporation incorporated in
Delaware for breach of the duties imposed by its laws. 1 1
For example, since a corporation is subject to taxation in the state
of incorporation, 10 2 Delaware has a significant interest in regulating
the behavior of corporate directors and managers whose behavior
will affect the profits of the corporation, and in turn, the tax revenue of the state.
The suggestion that the state of incorporation should have
jurisdiction over the officers and directors of the corporation in actions arising out of their conduct as officers and directors is not
new. 10 3 The Wisconsin long arm statute provides for such jurisdic10 4
tion.
The majority in Shaffer acknowledged Delaware's interest in
managing its corporations. 10 5 It found that interest relevant to a
choice-of-law question and not relevant to a jurisdiction question. 10 6 While the majority may have been correct in its assertion
that Delaware's greatest interest in the litigation was that of having
its laws applied, 10 7 the majority ignored the possibility that if the
defendants could not be brought to suit, Delaware law would not
apply.
The twenty-eight individual defendants were all nonresidents
of Delaware. While it is unclear from the facts of Shaffer where
those defendants resided, it is unlikely that they all resided in a
single state. Since a court must obtain in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant to bind him in a personal judgment, plaintiff
101.
102.

Brief for Appellees at 13, Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS 163 (1970).

103.

R. WEINTRAUB,

104.

WVis.

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 134 (1971).

(West 1977) provides in pertinent part:
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action . . . under any of the following circumstances:
STAT. ANN. § 801.05

In any action against a defendant who is or was an officer or director of
a domestic corporation where the action arises out of the defendant's conduct as such officer or director ....
105. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2586 (1977).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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would have to bring suit in each state where a defendant resided.
Assuming that plaintiff would not choose to bear the cost of multiple litigation, he would be denied a reasonable vehicle for bringing
his case to court. Under those circumstances, corporate directors,
officers, and other key personnel would escape the consequences of
corporate responsibility, and Delaware's interest in permitting effective recourse to its laws would not be vindicated. Therefore,
Delaware had a substantial, legitimate interest in the activities of
the individual defendants, relevant not only to a determination of
choice of laws, but to an assertion of jurisdiction as well.
Identifying plaintiff's interest in suing in Delaware presents a
problem. Appellee Heitner, who owned one share of Greyhound
stock, was a nonresident of Delaware. 10 8 However, in a shareholders' derivative suit, unlike a direct suit, the named plaintiff is
not the primary beneficiary of the suit. Rather, the benefit inures
to the corporation and to its shareholders. 10 9 Thus, while Heitner
was a nonresident of Delaware, suit was not brought in his behalf.
The primary beneficiary of the action was Greyhound, a Delaware
corporation. Thus, it is arguable that plaintiff had an interest in
bringing suit in Delaware.
Hence, there was state interest and arguably plaintiff -intere°t
sufficient to bring suit in Delaware. If defendant's interest in being
sued at home is sufficiently depreciated, then Delaware was a
reasonable forum for the dispute.
Although the majority rejected appellee's assertion that defendants had sufficient contacts with Delaware to depreciate their interest in being sued at home, appellee's argument was sound. In
dissent, Justice Brennan focused on the Hanson requirement that
the defendant "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking benefits and
protections of its laws." 1 10 Viewing their activities in this light, defendants chose to accept benefit and protection from-Dela-ware.
The individual defendants were more than mere stockholders
in the Greyhound Corporation. They were key employees, directors, and officers of the corporation. As such, they benefited significantly from the laws of Delaware:

108. Id. at 2572.
109.

H. HENN, LAw OF COR'ORATIONs 787 (1970).

110. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S.
Ct. 2569, 2589 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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[T]he provisions of the Delaware Corporate Law relating to
benefits of officers, directors, and key employees are perhaps the
most advanced provisions of kind. .... [The law] offers generous
indemnification protection to appellants. Delaware enacted this
statute to induce capable and responsible businessmen to accept
positions in corporate management .

. .

. In addition, [the law]

provides for interest free loans to directors,

officers, and

employees under certain circumstances.

Certainly the

.

.

foregoing benefits were in the minds of the individual appellants
when they accepted the powers and authorities of officers, directors, and employees of a Delaware corporation."'
The flaw in the majority's reasoning is underscored by a single
statement in the opinion. The majority claimed that the individual
defendants "simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware." 11 2 The Court rejected without explanation appellee's argument that by choosing to become officers of a Delaware corporation, defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the
benefits of the jurisdiction.' 1 3 It is clear, however, that defendants
chose to become associated with Delaware, received their authority
from that state, and could foresee the consequences in Delaware of
any out-of-State activity conducted on behalf of the corporation.
Thus, the majority's claim that defendants had nothing to do with
the State of Delaware is questionable. Given the apparent defect in
the majority opinion, it appears that the defendants had minimum
contacts with Delaware. Even in the presence of the prodefendant
bias, the defendants' interest in being sued at home was sufficiently
depreciated. Considering the strong state interest present, Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction should have been held valid.
In the Supreme Court's eagerness to change the muchcriticized law of jurisdiction,11 4 the Court in Shaffer exceeded what
was necessary to accomplish that goal. Since it was possible for the
Court to have rendered the identical holding and still have granted
jurisdiction to Delaware on these facts, the Court's decision was
unnecessarily severe. It appears that in the future, relatively exten111.

Answering Brief for Appellees at 15, Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569

(1977).
112. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2586 (1977).
113. Id.
114. The Court in Shaffer stated: "We think that the time is ripe to consider
whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in International
Shoe should be held to govern action in rem as well as in personam." Id. at 2581.
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sive activity, not minimum contacts, is necessary to defeat the prodefendant bias. Thus, the immediate future of the law of jurisdiction depends on whether future courts focus on the language of
115
Shaffer alone, or on its holding in conjunction with its facts.
THE EFFECT OF SHAFFER v.

HEITNER ON SEIDER V. ROTH 116

The Court in Shaffer stated: "To the extent that prior deci117
sions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled."'
While the Court established that Pennoyer and Harris v. Balk""
were inconsistent with the opinion, 1 19 the continuing utility of
other rulings must be determined by applying the International
Shoe test to the facts of each case.
In Seider v. Roth, 2 0° plaintiffs, residents of New York, were
injured in an automobile accident on a Vermont highway, allegedly
through the negligence of a Canadian defendant. 12 1 The defendant
was insured by the Hartford Insurance Company, which was doing
business 12 2 in New York. An order of attachment directed the
sheriff to levy upon the contractual obligation of Hartford to defend
and indemnify the defendant under a policy of automobile liability
insurance issued by Hartford to the defendant. 12 3 The insurance
company was served in New York while the defendant was served
124
in Quebec.
The insurance obligation was subject to attachment under sec-

115. At least one court has taken the position that Shaffer is "best read for the
legal concepts it enunciates rather than for application of them to the facts in the
record before it." O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 996
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
116. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
117. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2585 n.39 (1977).
118. 198 U.S. 215(1905).
119. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2585 (1977).
120. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
121. Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
122. Under Pennoyer presence within a state was sufficient ground for a state
to assert jurisdiction over a defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). In
the case of a corporation, which exists only as a legal entity, evidence that a corporation was conducting business within the state was considered an indication that the
corporation was present within that state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Under InternationalShoe evidence that a corporation does business within a state provides the requisite minimum contracts to justify assertion of
jurisdiction by the courts of that state. Id. at 317.,.
123. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 112, 216 N.E.2d 312, 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99,
100 (1966).
124. Id.
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tions 6202125 and 5201126 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules, which were constitutional under the doctrine of Harris v.
Balk.127 As Seider has been interpreted by New York courts, the
judgment against the nonresident defendant is limited by the face
value of the policy even though the defendant proceeds on the
merits. 128 Also, courts have found that unless unusual circumstances exist, 129 a plaintiff who is a nonresident of New York
may not attach the insurance policy of a nonresident defendant to
invoke the jurisdiction of a New York court.130 At least one court
has ruled that the insurer cannot escape the consequences of a
Seider attachment by including a clause in the insurance policy
which renders the policy ineffective in the event that it is attached. 131
Seider has been subject to a barrage of criticism by commentators' 32 and courts. 13 3 Of those criticisms, two are relevant to the
present discussion. 1 34 First, Seider has been criticized as, in effect,

125. This section provides in pertinent part: "Any debt of property against

which a money judgment may be enforced .. .is subject to attachment." N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 6202 (McKinney 1963).

126. This section describes in detail types of debts and property against which
a money judgment may be enforced. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 5201 (McKinney 1963).
127. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). See text accompanying note 80 supra.
128. Simpson v. Lochman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967).
129. See, e.g., McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct.
1970).
130. See, e.g., Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969);
Varaday v. Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Vaage, 265 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Donowitz v. Danek, 53 App. Div. 2d 679,
385 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2d Dep't 1976).
131. Seligman v. Tucker, 46 App. Div. 2d 402, 362 N.Y.S.2d 881 (4th Dep't
1975).
132. See generally Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction over Nonresidents-New York Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNCIL J. 118 (1968); Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO
L. REv. 769 (1967); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations
and the Interstate Corporation,67 COLUm. L. RPv. 550 (1967); Note, Seider v. Roth:
The ConstitutionalPhase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968).
133. See generally Robinson v. Shearer, 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970); Podolsky v.
Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Javorak v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d
629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358
A.2d 397 (1976).
134. The third criticism attacks Seider for permitting attachment of a contingent
debt when the attachment statute required a "debt which is past due or yet to become due, certainly or upon demand." N.Y. Civ. PAc: LAW § 5201(a) (McKinney
1963). See, e.g., Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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permitting an in personam judgment against an out-of-State defendant who has no minimal contacts with the forum state. 135 Second,
the opinion has been criticized as a judicially created direct action
against the insurer.13 6 Despite the pronouncements against Seider,
13 7
courts in New York have followed Seider extensively.
A Seider attachment produces the following practical effects: A
defendant whose insurance debt has been attached may either appear in New York to defend on the merits, or he may default; if he
defaults, he breaches the cooperation clause' 3z of his policy and his
insurance company is relieved of the obligation to indemnify
him. 13 9 Thus, if plaintiff so chooses, he may sue defendant in defendant's home state and obtain a personal judgment against him
which defendant must pay out-of-pocket, since he is no longer insured; uninsured, defendant may be judgment-proof. If he appears
in New York to defend, the judgment is only effective to the limits
40
of his policy.'
The defendant is not only protected by limitations on the nature of the judgment, but there probably can be no res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect to any findings of the New York court. 141
Thus, the only negative jurisdictional effect produced by defen135. See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

136. See id. at 490, 499.
137. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Newman v.
Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 99, 355 N.E.2d 294, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1976); Tickel v. Oddo, 66
Misc. 2d 385, 320 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Sup. Ct. 1971). Seider has not been widely followed
by courts outside New York. For an out-of-State decision following it, see Forbes v.
Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 120 (1973).
138. In the cooperation clause, the defendant effectively enters into a contract
with the insurer to act as witness in his own behalf. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
139. If the insurance company is not relieved of that obligation, the insurance
company would be forced to pay a judgment when it has had no opportunity to
defend the action on its merits. See Comment, Quasi in Rem JurisdictionBased on
Insurer's Obligations,19 STAN. L. REv. 654, 658 (1967).
140. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
141. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de,nied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). The Minichiello court indicated that commentators are
divided as to whether a quasi in rem judgment may be given collateral estoppel
effect. For an article suggesting that a quasi in rem judgment may not be given such
effect, see Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and ForeignJudgments, 24 OIO ST. L.J.
381, 384 (1963). For authority suggesting that collateral estoppel effect would be
permissible, see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 76(2) (1942). The Minichiello court

believed that despite the effect of collateral estoppel on an ordinary quasi in rem
judgment, given the nature of Seider as a direct action against the insurer, collateral
estoppel effect is inappropriate. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
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dant's appearance in New York is the inconvenience of being sued
142
away from home.
The constitutionality of Seider initially depends on whether
Seider is viewed as an action against the insured, or as a direct
action against the insurer. Viewing Seider first as an action against
the insured, under Shaffer we are compelled to apply the International Shoe balancing test to the facts of Seider. Plaintiff has an
interest in suing at home, while New York has an interest in seeing
that its citizens are adequately compensated by defendants who
cause injury so that uncompensated plaintiffs do not become financial burdens on the state.' 4 3 However, under International Shoe
the interests of the plaintiff and the state only become dispositive
where defendant's interest in conducting the litigation in his home
state has been depreciated. For defendant's interest to have been
depreciated sufficiently to defeat the prodefendant bias, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the benefit and
protection of the jurisdiction.' 4 4 Defendant in Seider did not,
through his activity, purposefully expose himself to the authority of
New York. His only contact with New York was that he was in14 5
sured by an insurance company that did business in New York.
While defendant purposefully chose to be insured, he did not purposefully choose to be insured in New York. If he were insured by
Allstate Insurance Company, it would be absurd to charge him with
purposefully availing himself of the benefit of all fifty states. Thus,
142. The inconvenience to the defendant is reduced to some degree, since the
insurance company is likely to cover reasonable travel expenses incurred by the defendant. See Comment, Quasi in Rem JurisdictionBased on Insurer's Obligations, 19
STAN. L. REv. 654, 668 n.25 (1967). For a discussion of this practice, see Note, Direct
Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74 HARv. L. REv.
357 (1960).
143. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954).
144. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). However, it may not always
be true that in-State activity is the only factor which can depreciate a defendant's
interest in being sued at home. Assume a situation in which two out of three litigants, the plaintiff and one defendant, are New York residents. Assume further that
the statute of limitations has run in the nonresident defendant's home state. Jurisdiction might be granted on the theory that the necessity for bringing the litigation in
New York, in addition to the other defendants' residence in New York, sufficiently
depreciates the nonresident defendant's interest in being sued at home to favor the
state and plaintiff's interests. For a case following InternationalShoe, which, in effect, establishes jurisdiction by necessity, see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). The Court in Shaffer purposefully left this question unanswered. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2584 n.37 (1977).
145. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 112, 216 N.E.2d 312, 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 99 (1966).
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despite the state and plaintiff interest in asserting jurisdiction,
the lack of defendant's contacts with New York prevents that state
from asserting jurisdiction if the resulting judgment would have
the effect of an in personam judgment. 146 Seider v. Roth 147 and the
cases which limit the Seider attachment procedure to New York
plaintiffs14 8 focus on the interests of the state and plaintiff without a
sufficient showing that defendant's interests have been depreciated.
Thus, if Seider v. Roth 14 9 is viewed as an action against the
insured, the jurisdictional restraints of International Shoe imposed
on Seider by Shaffer v. Heitner'5 0 compel the conclusion that
Seider would probably be decided differently today. Seider, however, may be viewed in a manner in which International Shoe is
irrelevant. As the Seider court recognized, 15 1 and as many commentators 152 and courts' 53 have argued, Seider created a direct action against the insurer. That is, the real party in interest is the
insurer rather than the insured.
Practically, the insurer in a case such as this is in full control
of the litigation. It selects the attorneys, decides if and when to
settle, and makes all procedural decisions. 154 Furthermore, the insurer has its own interest to protect, since it must pay the judgment. 155 Under this scheme, there is no difficult jurisdictional
question. The defendant insurance company, doing business in
New York, is subject to in personam jurisdiction. The insured is
merely called into the state because of a private contractual agreement with his insurance company in which he agreed to appear as
a witness in his defense.
Under the direct action scheme, the nonresident defendant is
146. However, it was argued in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F.
Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), that the effect of Seider, as it has been interpreted

by the courts, is unique since a Seider attachment achieves a judgment less than in
personam. See text accompanying notes 138-140 supra.
147. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
148. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
149. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
150. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
151. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99,
102 (1966).
152. See, e.g., Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in
Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. 1Elv. 769, 774 (1967); Note, Seider v. Roth:
The ConstitutionalPhase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. RPv. 58 (1968).

153. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
154. See Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d
503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967).
155. See Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations,
19 STAN. L. REv. 654, 656 (1967).
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called on to defend in a distant state by the use of a coercive measure. In effect, it leads to the same result as under a quasi in rem
attachment. However, in assessing coercion under this scheme, the
relevant questions are not those of minimum contacts and interest
balancing, but those involving the validity of a direct action against
an insurer. As one commentator has stated: "Liability insurance
policies customarily provide that no action shall lie against the
company until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall
have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the
15 6
claimant, and the company."
Despite this general rule, the Supreme Court in Watson v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp.1 57 ruled that a Louisiana statute creating a direct action against the insurers of tortfeasors causing injury in Louisiana was not a denial of due process. The Court
found that Louisiana had a legitimate interest which justified the
statute:
Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling
in affairs beyond her boundaries which are no concern of hers.
Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be
Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care
for them. Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana
homes or hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be
destitute. They may be compelled to call upon friends, relatives,
or the public for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in the injured by providing remedies for recovery of damages. It has a similar interest in policies of insurance which are
designed to assure ultimate payment of such damages.
Moreover, Louisiana courts in most instances provide the most
convenient forum for trial of these cases. 158
Since the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a
direct action statute, other states have enacted such statutes. 159
156. R. KEETON, INSuRANCE LAW 534 (1971).

157. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
158. Id. at 72. The situation in Watson, however, can be distinguished from
that in Seider, since the Louisiana statute applied only to accidents or injuries occurring in Louisiana. However, the court in Minichiello analyzed the Court's underlying
purpose in Watson and found that the same policy considerations apply to residents
of a state as well as to persons injured within the state. Thus, the court concluded
that the Supreme Court was likely to sustain the validity of a direct action in a Seider
situation. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969).
159. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 260.11(1) (West Supp.
1976). See also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1959 & 1977 Supp.).
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New York already provides by statute for a direct action against the
insurer under limited circumstances. 160 The statute provides that if,
at the expiration of thirty days from the entry of judgments against
the insured, plaintiff's claim is still unsatisfied, a direct action may
be brought against the insurer. 16 1 Case law in New York suggests
the New York courts will look favorably upon a direct action statute.
In Oltarsh v. Aetna Insurance Co., 162 the New York State Court of
Appeals upheld a direct action when it was authorized by the situs
jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York advanced one step further: It accepted a direct action in the absence of a direct action statute in either New
63
York or the situs state.1
While Seider employed the language of quasi in rem jurisdiction, it effectively created a general direct action against the insurer. In light of the constitutionality 164 of direct action statutes
and New York's apparent willingness to accept them, Seider v.
Roth' 65 may be found constitutionally sound when viewed as creating a direct action against the insurer, broader than the limited
direct action statute now in effect in New York, with the named
defendant merely a fictional representative.' 66 Recently, one court
has taken this position in upholding the validity of Seider in light of
1 67
Shaffer.
However, the reasons for overruling Seider are more compellink than those for its affirmance. While permitting a general direct
action against insurers may be desirable, Seider is not the proper
vehicle for achieving that end. First, general direct actions against
insurers have been created in other states by legislatures, not
courts.' 68 New York itself has statutorily created a right of direct
action against insurers under limited circumstances. 1 6 9 New York
has had the opportunity for eleven years to enact a general direct

160.

N.Y. INS. LAW § 167 (McKinney 1977).

161. Id.
162. 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
163. Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
164. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
165. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
166. The purpose of maintaining this fiction is to "prevent overly-sympathetic
juries from learning that the defendant is insured." O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving

Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
167. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
168. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 535 (1971).
169. N.Y. INS. LAw § 167 (McKinney 1977). See text accompanying note 160
supra.
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action statute in lieu of Seider, but it has not done so. 170 Even if
there presently remains any intent on the part of the legislature
to create such a direct action, it is inappropriate for the New York
State Court of Appeals-to accomplish indirectly that which the legislature will not do directly. 17 ' Thus, reliance on the direct action
effect of Seider is misplaced, since it is not the province of the
courts to legislate.
Moreover, even if it is desirable to permit a court to make a
determination which has heretofore been legislative, Seider is
poorly reasoned authority for permitting direct action. Seider invites confusion: The opinion focuses on the insured as the real party
in interest; the direct action effect is underplayed. Thus, it would
be confusing to retain Seider to achieve direct action since the opinion gives least weight to the point which would now be considered
most significant.
Only the legislature wields power to create a direct action
statute. Such a statute would presumably be drafted to avoid the
inconsistencies of Seider. Since a court is the wrong forum in which
to create direct actions against the insurer, Seider should be overruled.
CONCLUSION

It is too soon after Shaffer to examine the impact that that
opinion has had on the law of state court jurisdiction; 72 however,
170. The legislature did attempt to enact a direct action statute in lieu of
Seider, but the proposed enactment was vetoed by the Governor because of drafting
deficiencies, not because of the meritsof the legislation. See Governor's Message on
Vetoing #9 A. 8102; #26 S. 2253, [1973] N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 349. Since the Covernors veto was based on a drafting deficiency, the legislature might have redrafted
and reproposed the legislation. Since there is no direct action legislation in effect to
date, it appears that the legislature did not choose to redraft the legislation. That the
legislation appears not to have been redrafted casts doubt on the continuing intent of
the legislature to enact such legislation.
171. See, e.g., Donowitz v. Danek, 53 App. Div. 2d 679, 385 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2d
Dep't 1976).
172. There has, however, been one recent decision interpreting Shaffer. In
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977)
(excerpts of opinion), the federal district court granted jurisdiction to a California
court which did not have minimum contacts with defendant; however, authority was
granted to attach in-State property for the limited purpose of satisfying a judgment
being sought in a New York court which had in personam jurisdiction to arbitrate
over the defendant. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California ruled that jurisdiction for this purpose was an exception to the Shaffer
requirement that all assertions of state court jurisdiction require minimal contacts. Id.
at 2195. The court reasoned that this is an exception since the Court in Shaffer found
that the initial purpose of quasi in rem jurisdiction was to prevent a wrongdoer from
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certain repercussions may be anticipated. Most apparent is the increase in the scope of International Shoe. A more subtle effect is
that increased application of InternationalShoe is likely to exacerbate the problems inherent in that standard. In particular, Shaffer
is likely to generate litigation over the meaning of vague terms
such as "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice."
In resolving those disputes, courts looking to Shaffer will perceive
a similar message, whether they read the dicta or the holding of
Shaffer. Although the latter message is stronger, Shaffer, in its
emphasis of the relationships among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation, is a reaffirmation of the prodefendant bias. Thus, past
decisions which underplay the significance of Hanson v. Denckla173
are likely to come under attack.
Seider was one such decision. Although Seider was recently
upheld in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 174 that conclusion of
validity was only made possible by disregarding the message of
Hanson.17 5 Thus, on appeal, O'Connor should be reversed for disregarding the prodefendant bias which maintains its importance in
light of Shaffer. Since Seider also disregarded the prodefendant
bias, and since it cannot be justified as a direct action statute, it
176
should be overturned.
Lesley Beth Magaril
avoiding payment of a judgment by removing his assets to a jurisdiction where he

was not subject to suit. Thus, the court in Carolina Power held California's jurisdiction effective, and acknowledged a distinction between jurisdiction to adjudicate the
underlying merits and jurisdiction to attach property as security for a judgment being
sought in a legitimate forum. Id. The court qualified its holding, stating that in some
circumstances even limited jurisdiction to attach property would nonetheless violate
standards of fair play and substantial justice as, for example, where presence of a
defendant's property in the forum state is merely fortuitous. Id.
173. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
174. 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
175. Id. Judge Dooling stated: "Despite Hanson v. Denckla . . . an analysis of
jurisdictional propriety in the ultimate terms implied by Shaffer cannot ignore the
claimants' circumstances and her interest in litigating in the forum of her residence."
Id. at 997 (citation omitted).
176. Since completion of this note, there has been much discussion in the legal
community about Seider's status in light of Shaffer. Commentators and lecturers attempt to resolve the issue by analysis such as that in this note. Seigal, Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5201 (McKinney 1977); McLaughlin, Seider v. Roth-Dead or Alive, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (commentators); Address by Thomas Walsh, Nassau County Bar Association, Nassau County,
N.Y. (Jan. 25, 1978) (lecturer). Several New York courts have already ruled, but
there is little agreement among them. In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437
F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), Judge Dooling held Seider to be valid insofar as it
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provides a basis for direct action against the insurer. Id. at 1004. However, both
Judge Bramwell in Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar, Inc., Civ. No. 77-1819
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1977), and Judge Composto in Katz v. Umansky, 46 U.S.L.W.
2302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 25, 1977) rejected Seider as based on a jurisdictional theory
and lacking the minimum contacts required by Shaffer. Finally, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that Shaffer would affect Seider in Rush v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 97 S. Ct. 2964 (1977). Before the Court would apply the Seider doctrine, it
remanded the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court which had adopted Seider,
Savchuk v. Rush, 245 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 1976), judgment vacated and remanded
sub nom. Rush v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 97 S. Ct. 2964 (1977), for reevaluation in light of Shaffer.
The first appellate court to address the continued validity of Seider held that
Seider, because of its direct action effect on the insurer, satisfies the requirements of
Shaffer and therefore still provides a basis for jurisdiction. Alford v. McGaw, 402
N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978).
As this note went to press, the Second Circuit held that jurisdiction over a defendant foreign corporation under the New York attachment statute, upon which
Seider is based, is constitutional under Shaffer, in view of defendant's contacts with
New York other than its property attached within New York. Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Apr. 27, 1978, at 1, col. 6 (2d Cir. Apr. 14, 1978). However,
because the court refused to determine whether the defendant's contacts would
have been sufficient to assert in personam jurisdiction, this case may suggest that a
lower standard for minimum contacts will be tolerated when jurisdiction is initiated
under an attachment statute.
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